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Law and power in a world with no transaction costs: an essay on the
legitimating function of the Coasian narrative.
Francesco Denozza
                                           Abstract
This  paper  discusses the possible legitimating function (understood as the ability to
provide an appropriate framework for the development of rational arguments
supporting  legal principles and rules) of the Coasian “narrative”. I argue that the
Coasian narrative is inadequate to provide rational legitimacy to the theoretical
roots of the economic analysis of law movement. The argument starts with the
distinction between transaction costs that could be eliminated even if at times their
elimination would be impossible or too expensive (“social transaction costs”) and
transaction costs that could disappear only in a world ruled by physical laws different
from the laws that govern the real world (”natural transaction costs”). The thesis
presented in this paper is that a Coasian world   of a "human" kind (defined as a
world- conceivable without breaking the physical and psychological laws that govern
our real world - in which social transaction costs are absent, but natural transaction
costs are present) is not a place worth living in. In order for us  to imagine a world
devoid of the defects of a “human” Coasian world, we should imagine   a "divine" kind
of world, populated by God-like creatures  and not by human beings. A world that
everyone can model at his/her own pleasure, and that can provide rational legitimacy
to nothing.
This paper goes on to argue that the Coasian narrative ignores the “dispositional”
nature of legal power and hides the distinction between influence and power. If these
theoretical limits are appropriately removed, the centrality of the notion of
transaction costs loses legitimacy and appears subordinate with regard to the primary
goal of limiting the power that certain  private individuals can exert over others.
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1.Introduction.
This paper focuses on the possible “legitimating” function of what I would call
the “Coasian narrative”. This expression (Coasian narrative ) as employed in the
present context, refers especially to  the use of the Coase’s thought in the construction
of  the theoretical references underpinning  most of  the arguments elaborated by the
economic analysis of law movement. The Coasian narrative is therefore constituted of
as a set of beliefs and convictions whit wider and more general implications than those
strictly derivable  from the literal interpretation of the works of Coase. 1
In the Coasian narrative the Coasian world (defined as a world with no
transaction costs) is imagined as the uncontested reign of efficiency and individual
freedom and liberty, an Eden in need of little law and substantially no lawmakers2, in
which individuals can always  establish agreements apt at self-regulating their lives.
Even if it is widely recognized that this state of perfection is practically unobtainable3,
the reference to the Coasian world supports the thesis that the analysis of the
transaction costs that are in fact present in the real world (the things that keep us apart
from the Eden) and their possible elimination, should be the basis and likewise the goal
of any legal proposal, be it aimed at creating new a law or at interpreting the existing
                                                
1 See infra  note 4 and accompanying text.
2 “According to the Coase Theorem, there is no continuing need for government  under these
conditions [ zero transaction costs]. Like the deist god, the government retires from the scene after
creating some rights over externalities, and efficiency is achieved regardless of what rights were
created” R.COOTER, The Cost of Coase,  XI Journal of LegaL Studies,19 (1982).
3 The existence of market  at zero transaction costs is considered by Coase himself a “very
unrealistic assumption” R.H.COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, in Coase, The Firm the
Market and the Law,, University of Chicago Press, 1988, p.114
3one. In this sense the reference to the Coasian world performs the function of
legitimating  the main arguments used by the adherents to the economic analysis of law
movement.
In this paper I argue that the Coasian narrative’s ability to perform a
legitimating function is  generally quite low and of no value whatsoever as far as
providing a rational legitimacy is concerned. I  furthermore argue that the assumption -
so widespread in the economic analysis of law movement- that the transaction costs
should be the main subject and  starting point of every legal analysis is completely
misdirected.
I shall commence my argument with the distinction between two kinds of
transaction costs: transaction costs that theoretically could be eliminated, even if  a t
times their elimination would be impossible or too expensive (e.g. the transaction costs
stemming from one party’s lack of information owned by the other party of the
transaction) and transaction costs that could disappear only in a world ruled by physical
and psychical laws different from the laws that govern the real world ( e.g. transaction
costs stemming from lack of information which no human being owns and could own).
Let us call the former  “social transaction costs” and the latter “natural transaction
costs”.
Consequently, we can disentangle the ambiguity of the recurrent statement that a
world with no transaction costs does not exist, by distinguishing between a non-
existent, but quite possible, world, and a world conceivable only through imagining an
external or internal nature that is completely different from that of the real world. Let
us call the former a “human Coasian world” and the latter a “divine Coasian world”.  
My point is that a human Coasian world (a world in which social transaction costs
are eliminated but natural transaction costs are present) not only does it not exhibit the
positive qualities usually attributed to the Coasian world, it is a world not worth living
in. The relationship between a divine Coasian world  and a human Coasian world  is not
4that of a progressive approximation to the achievement of the values allegedly
governing a Coasian world. From a perspective that is centered on values, rather than
on analytical properties, there is no ideal   path   that commences in the real world,  is
then improved in a human Coasian world and is later brought to perfection in a divine
Coasian world. The human Coasian world simply does not  fulfill- not even partially-
the promises of a divine Coasian world.
The conclusion of the first part of this paper is that either reference be made t o
the human Coasian world,   then no legitimacy can be provided by evoking this world’s
image, due to the fact that it is not a world worth living in; or reference be made to a
divine Coasian world, then no rational legitimacy can be provided by evoking the image
of a world  not only  non-existent but unconceivable within the natural laws  governing
the real  universe.
In the second part of the paper I argue that once the reference to a divine
Coasian world has been dismissed, then the assumption of  human or social transaction
costs as a starting point for every legal analysis lacks any legitimacy. Power
asymmetries are the legitimate starting point, as they are the main factors -even in a
market-based economy- that shape human relationships.
     2 .The “legitimating” function and the Coasian narrative.
For “legitimating” function I understand in the present context the ability t o
provide reasonable arguments  supporting the legitimacy of a set of institutions, and
grounds for considering    legitimate  a given theory on how to build institutions and
rules.  It is therefore intended in the sense of “providing legitimacy” and not in the   
legal sense   of “making lawful”.    
In fact the paper seeks to answer the question whether the Coasian narrative is
able to   legitimate a specific way of framing the legal problems connected with the
assignment    of rights   to private subjects and to suggest appropriate criteria for
evaluating the different possible solutions to those problems.
5It is my understanding that a legitimating function is less demanding than a
normative function. The latter implies a model capable of providing precise indications
and of suggesting unequivocal choices  (however difficult the identification of the right
choice in the real world might be). The former implies instead a narrative  which
provides a framework for developing rational, though disputable, arguments.
In this vein, the subject of this study is not   the   Coase theorem and the problem
of its validity,   but the set of  principles and likewise the ethical and political
prescriptions (built on, and around, this piece of knowledge) that aim at carrying out
the function of a ( local, but surely quite ambitious)  narrative, allowing our society “
on the one hand, to define its criteria of competence and, on the other, to evaluate
according to those criteria what is performed or can be performed within it.” 4
The reasons for examining the Coase theorem not from the viewpoint of its
truth and   its objective features, but from a subjective and evaluative point of view, are
obviously connected to the   legitimating function that the Coasian world and the
connected narrative, perform (largely   beyond Coase’s intentions 5) in a substantial
                                                
4 J-F LYOTARD, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge , English  translation,
Manchester University Press, 1984, p. 20.
5 The lack of exact correspondence between the Coase’s  thought and its reception in the economic
analysis of law movement is widely recognized. See e.g. S.G. MEDEMA, Through a Glass
Darkly or Just Wearing Dark Glasses? Posin, Coase and the Coase Theorem, 62 Tenn. L. Rev.
1041 (1995); D. CAMPBELL-S.PICCIOTTO, Exploring the Interaction between Law and
Economics: the Limits of Formalism, 18 Legal Studies, 249 (1998), underline ”the very
questionable nature of the way in which the work of Ronald Coase has been taken up by those
who claim to be his followers…”
In fact, in the work of Coase there is a constant concern for giving precise and well defined sense
and scope to his intellectual discoveries. He usually underlines the fact that a world without
transaction costs is “unrealistic” (see e.g. R.H. COASE, The Firm, The market and The Law,
University of Chicago Press,  1988, p.114; R.H. COASE, Essays on Economics and Economists,
University of Chicago Press,1994, p.11, “…I tend to regard the Coase  Theorem as a stepping
stone on the way to an analysis of an economy with positive transaction costs. The significance to
me of the Coase Theorem is that it undermines the Pigovian system…..My conclusion: Let us
6part of the economic analysis of law movement.  Putting aside all   possible  
discussions   concerning the different approaches that coexist in such movement, it
seems to me that its core is inseparable from the legacy of the Coase’ lesson.
Therefore this paper’s   targets are   not just the interpretations using the Coase
theorem as a mechanical device capable of providing an immediate solution to every
social choice problem, but also the more flexible interpretations that acknowledge the
ubiquitous presence (in the real world) of high transaction costs and recommend   a
careful analysis of the relevant circumstances of each single case. At least up to the
point that both start from the idea that reduction of transaction costs, and
approximation to the results the parties would have reached through bargaining absent
transaction costs, are the most important goals legal rules should pursue, rigid and
flexible interpretations both inevitably use the reference to the Coasian narrative as a
legitimating device, in the sense that the founding arguments   eventually justifying  the
resulting assignments of rights and duties, institutions and practices, stem in both cases
from regarding social arrangements as means to reproduce in the real world at least
some (if not all) the positive features of a Coasian world.
In this perspective the fact that a Coasian world does not exist is not as such a
possible obstacle with regard to the performance of a legitimating function, as  the fact
that a state of nature or a social contract never existed is not an obstacle to the
legitimating function those concepts perform in the doctrines of Hobbes, Rousseau or
Rawls. What does count is the nature of the imagined world. As we shall see, the
relevant question is whether the imagined world is a world governed by the same
physical and psychological laws that govern the real world, or  a world which can only
                                                                                                                                     
study the world of positive transaction costs”). He explicitly refused the parenthood of the concept
of “Coasian world” (Id., The Firm,  p. 274).
7be conceived by subverting the laws which characterize the human external and internal
nature.
Therefore we face two different questions. On  the one  hand, we may ask
ourselves  whether the Coasian world, even if  non-existent, is a world conceivable
anyway as a possible  human world. On the other hand, there is the question whether it
is a world in which collective action  problems are correctly solved and benefits for
collective activity appropriately provided and  distributed. In short: is it a world worth
living in  ?
In my opinion, the answer to the latter question defines the ability of the Coasian
narrative to perform a legitimating function. The answer to the former question defines
the kind of legitimacy the Coasian narrative might be able to provide. Let us dig deeper
into the different profiles  of these two questions.
3.The ability to perform a legitimating function.
Commencing with the  question on whether the Coasian narrative is capable of
performing a legitimating function, we noted that it depends on  whether a Coasian
world is a world in which collective action problems are correctly solved and benefits
for collective activity appropriately provided and  distributed. We readily recognize
that the  question  does not permit indisputable answers. The notions of correctness and
appropriateness are amply exposed to the risk of being filled with different contents by
different people. Thus, what is deemed correct and appropriate by an individual, may
appear to another as incorrect and inappropriate. However, claims of correctness and
appropriateness are just the claims “that we advance with norms of action or of
evaluation”6. This, I argue, is the reason for considering them  as pertinent claims,
when referred to a Coasian world,  interpreted as a possible legitimating device of a set
of  principles and rules.
                                                
6 J.HABERMAS, Legitimation Crisis, English translation, Polity Press, 1988, p. 10.
8Correctness and appropriateness of  rules and institutions,  depend, in turn, on the
system of values on which they are based and likewise  on the level of coherence they
are able to reach in putting those values into practice.
Thus the first question is: what system of values governs a Coasian world?
Obviously the answer depends on how we define a Coasian world .
As a first approximation we can imagine  a Coasian world as  a world in which the
law can limit itself to fix the prerequisites (in particular , an exact definition  of
property rights) for the continued existence of a reproduction process exclusively based
on voluntary exchanges. The Coasian world so defined is a set of rules and institutions
(individual rights on each and every available resource, enforceable contracts and
freedom of exchange, are the main elements that characterize it) plus another
ambiguous element, absence of transaction costs (ambiguous because, as we will see, it is
not clear whether the absence of transaction costs is a physical or a social property of
this world).
In a Coasian world two main values are satisfied at the maximum possible level.
The first is efficiency, that in this context can be considered as a value since here it is
intended  as the maximization   of the overall welfare. Thus, not as a means or as a set
of means, but as an end in itself,  which claims appreciation for its own sake and not for
its ability to secure other ends.
The second relevant value is liberty. In a Coasian world each individual is
endowed with a domain in which he/she can freely dispose of himself/herself and of a
given amount of resources, no matter the effects that his/her decisions can have on
third parties.
People disturbed by the decisions of anyone else can use the resources at their
disposal in order to convince the others to change their decisions and therefore t o
dispose of their resources in a less disturbing way. The final result will be a world in
which everyone can push for a use of the available resources in the way that maximizes
9his or her satisfaction, with the only constraints stemming from the free exploitation
of the same option by every other individual.
The main value with which the two values of efficiency and liberty notoriously
conflict   is that of equality, or, more generally, that of a fair distribution of the
available resources. The potential conflict among those values is in fact the leit-motiv
of all disputes   concerning the moral validity of the economic analysis of law.
The Coasian narrative suggests a solution, through the severing of two
perspectives. The allocative point of view, which considers only the effects that a
choice   to assign given resources may have on the  overall  welfare, and the distributive
point of view, which considers  the assignment of the resources according to fairness
criteria. The distinction allows a hierarchical ordering of the two perspectives. The
order is that the distributional concerns must be postponed every time they come into
conflict with efficiency goals7. However, this sacrifice may not remain without its
rewards. Having obtained the biggest possible pie, due to the sacrifice of  the interests of
some individuals, the society can dispose of more resources, that it can periodically
employ in endeavoring to redress the situations that may occasionally appear
particularly unfair8.
Moreover, we can assume an equal distribution of initial resources (nothing in the
Coasian narrative excludes that the transactions take place between  parties provided
with an equal endowment of resources).  In this situation, even a lawmaker  tormented
                                                
7 The point is especially elaborated by . L.Kaplow and S. Shavell, ‘ Fairness Versus Welfare’,
114 Harvard Law Review (2001) p. 961.
8 On the problems  raised by this distribution in two stages, s. F. DENOZZA,  Fairness and
Welfare:are they really competing values? In Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions,  edited
by Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano, Routledge Siena Studies in Political
Economy, Routledge, 2007, at 159.
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by anxieties of distributive justice could adopt an abstentionist attitude, limiting its
interventions to few occasional actions aimed at correcting specific distortions.
In summary: the possible virtues of a Coasian world  are the maximization of
both the individual liberty (all transfers of goods  only take place through  agreements
amongst their holders, and the lawmaker’s intervention is confined to very rare  and
special occasions) and  of the overall welfare (all the transfers of goods are by
definition welfare enhancing). As to the distributive concerns, the possible sacrifices of
the individuals who, being destitute of rights, are compelled  to “buy” from other
individuals  the conducts that they are not entitled to impose, may be considered as
functional to, and likewise justified by, the goal of reaching a more efficient use of the
available resources. What is more, distributional concerns may be in any case attenuated
by a fair initial distribution of the resources and by sporadic interventions of the
legislator.
Therefore, if we were to assume that a Coasian world is a world in which
efficiency and liberty are maximized up to the optimum, and if we accept the said
compromise between- on the one hand- efficiency and liberty operating  as  main
values and -on the other hand- fairness operating as a subordinated, though  not totally
dismissed, value, then we can consider the Coasian world as an ideal, capable of
legitimating each and every choice of the real lawmaker heading to steer  the real world
to approximate the Coasian one.
4. Legitimacy: two distinguished   kinds  of legitimacy
In the previous paragraph we defined the conditions that the Coasian narrative
necessitates   in order to  carry out a legitimating function. Now we  can  go back to the
question concerning the kind of legitimacy that can be provided by the Coasian
narrative.
In order to define the kind of legitimacy that can be provided by a given
narrative, we can resort - coloring it   with an evaluative connotation - to the
11
conceptual framework underpinning the distinction between different types of
legitimate   authority elaborated by Max Weber9.
Max Weber   especially considered the problem that concerned the definition of
legitimacy, considered as an empirical fact, and the classification of  its possible
sources.  I   would   instead   focus   on the   types of arguments that can induce those
involved in a power relationship to believe that power is legitimate. In this perspective,
and therefore with a rather peculiar meaning, I will use the notions of rational and
traditional legitimacy and contrast them from the point of view  of  the narratives by
which each can be supported.    
I have already underlined that the fact, as such considered, that the Coasian world
does not exist, does not constitute an obstacle to considering it as a narrative able t o
provide legitimating criteria for the real world. As I have also underlined, many
arguments  are provided through the reference to worlds or to processes that do not,
and did not, exist, as the state of nature or the social contract.
        However, I believe that a distinction must be made, between a world  that,  albeit
inexistent, may be conceived as possible, taking for granted the main features of the
real world, and a world which is conceivable only by imagining physical or
psychological conditions not allowed by the natural laws which govern our world.
Whereas the reference to the former can provide rational arguments for   legitimating
a given institution or system of domination, the reference to the latter can provide
only arguments akin to that supported by the belief in the sanctity of tradition or  in
the moral value of attempting to gain a perfect status, which is however acknowledged
as unattainable in our real world.
         I think that we could apply to those different kinds of imagined worlds, the
distinction  (inspired by Weber, but largely adapted, as we saw, to the context of our
                                                
9 M. WEBER, Economy and Society,  English translation, University of California Press, 1978,
s.212 ff.
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discussion) between authority legitimated by rationality  (an authority based on  belief
- having “an immanent relation to truth”10- in a rationally sustainable legitimacy)
and authority legitimated through tradition.
I would like to repeat that in my opinion  arguments provided by the reference t o
an imaginary, but possible world, may be used to demonstrate the rational character of
an entire system or of a single rule. The reference to a world that cannot be conceived
as possible, may provide only arguments akin to that resting upon belief in the
sacredness of settled traditions. Arguments which in our   post-metaphysical world 11
have a very limited force 12
As we shall see, the question whether the Coasian world must be classified in the
first or in the second category, whether it can provide rational or only traditional-like
legitimacy, is strictly linked to a better definition of what we intend for transaction
costs, and to a   consequent better definition of what we conceive as a Coasian world.
 We shall   further examine this question later.
5.What could happen  in a “human Coasian world” ?
 As we saw, the core of the juridical insight of the Coasian narrative,   is that  a
world with well defined individual rights on every available resource, and no transaction
costs, can be effectively regulated by agreements between the holders of such rights
without the need for legislative action other than those necessary for  the initial
definition of rights.
                                                
10 J.HABERMAS, Legitimation Crisis, English translation, Polity Press, 1988,  p.97.
11 J.HABERMAS, Between Facts and Norms, English translation, Polity Press, 1996, p.443.
12 As I have already underlined, the focus here is not on the analytical truth of the so -called
Coase’s theorem. The recognized utility of the reference to a non - existent world from an
analytical viewpoint (as to a frictionless world in mechanical physique) does not contrast with the
scant ability (argued in the text) for this kind of reference to provide rational justifications
regarding the choice of  acceptable institutions and rules. The truth of the Pythagorean theorem is
not a sufficient, or even good, argument for accepting the mystic philosophy of the Pythagoreans.
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Using an example that is quite different from those used by Coase, but equally
classic, we can isolate a part of this world imagining a lake used jointly by a factory for
the discharge of  water used in its production processes and by riparian owners for
bathing. As is well known, in this kind of world, and still assuming that there are no
transaction costs, the lawmaker could limit itself   to define the rights on the use of  all
the lake water, leaving the factory owner and the riparian owners free to bargain among
themselves the concrete use each can make of the lake water. As is also known,
according to a widespread   opinion, only the exact definition of the rights in question
would be essential.  Irrelevant, from the allocative  viewpoint, would be the choice of
the   subjects to whom the rights are assigned. Repeating things now very familiar, the
intuition in this regard is that if the utility  of the clean water to the bathers  is greater
than that obtained by the factory, they will refuse to allow the factory to pollute (if
they are the holder of the right on the use of the water) or they will pay the factory t o
not pollute ( if the factory owner is the holder of the right on the water). In both cases,
the resources will always be used in a way that maximizes the overall welfare.
Obviously in the latter hypothesis bathers will be a little poorer (and the owner of
the factory a little   richer) than they would have been if the right had been assigned t o
the bathers from the outset ( this is the obvious effect of the initial distribution of
rights). This is an effect whose existence is difficult to   dispute13, but which can be
eliminated or at least attenuated -as we have already underlined- by an egalitarian
assignment of the original rights.  
Suppose  that in the process of the   original assignment the right to discharge
into the lake is clearly assigned to the factory and  that  the pollution generated by the
factory’s discharge  of waste water is below  the  level  that, according to the
preferences of the riparian owners, could induce them to make an offer to the factory
owner  so as to induce her to stop  polluting.  Consequently,   the lake  is  used by the
                                                
13 See,  however,  Coase ‘s remarks on this point in The Firm, supra note 3, at 170.
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factory and by the bathers, according to their respective preferences, in the most
efficient way.
Supposing now that an inventor- may be the same factory owner- discovers a new
technique that permits production at a lower cost,  but  involves much higher levels of
pollution (obviously the example was not chosen by pure chance: technology changes
are just the kind of events that can put the definition of rights “under continuous
pressure to change”14).
The question whether such occurrence  (the unforeseen invention of a new
technique) may in itself undermine the assumption of zero transaction costs will be
examined later. For now, let us   explore what could happen in the world I have just
described (a   world characterized by the fact that individuals can freely contract for
each other’s rights) and that I would  qualify as a “human” Coasian world.
In this world,   the factory owner will offer the inventor a price, for the use of
the invented technique, at maximum equal to the costs she will save using the new
technology. The bathers will try to convince the inventor not to  sell the technique t o
the factory owner  and to this end they will offer an amount of money corresponding
to the benefits they derive from the opportunity of swimming in clean water.
Let us assume that this sum is greater than that the owner of the factory is able
to offer. The result of the free bargaining amongst all the interested parties will be the
non-adoption of the new technology. This result is certainly efficient. The trend of the
deals shows that the new technique produces costs for the bathers that are higher than
the costs it would be able to save when used by the factory.
From a distributive point of view the result   raises rather less enthusiasm. The
inventor receives a reward for having invented a socially harmful, useless, technique,
whilst the   bathers  have to pay a fee (to the inventor or to the factory owner) t o
continue doing what they were doing before for  free .
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If this result is (as indeed seems to me) not desirable, there are two possible
options. The first is a lawmaker's   intervention limiting the right of  the factory, by
preventing pollution beyond a definite level. In this case, the factory owner would not
be able to compensate the bathers, the new technique   remains equally unemployed and
there is no transfer of wealth.
The second alternative is that the lawmaker intervenes by taxing the inventor
and subsidizing the bathers. It follows a distribution that in the real world would be very
expensive and in a Coasian world would be completely free, but in both cases of
decidedly questionable rationality.
I think this simple example demonstrates two things. The first thing it
demonstrates is that in a human Coasian world significant transfers of wealth may occur
that are in no way connected to the increasing of the overall welfare. In our example
the wealth available to the society after the dealing is identical to that existing before
the trading day. The difference is simply that some have become richer whilst others
have become poorer.
Secondly, a world organized on the basis of an initial attribution of rights and free
negotiations between private rights-holders, with no intervention by   the lawmaker,
produces results whose acceptability is highly questionable. The prevention of the
gigantic, and socially unnecessary, transfers of wealth that could occur in this kind of  
society  necessitates continuous  intervention. The lawmaker faces every moment the
choice between creating and assigning new rights in relation to new possibilities for
action created by innovation, or to correct the distributional distortion created by the
combined effect of innovation and original allocations of rights.
In the first case, the attraction exerted by a model in which the results are the
fruit of a game where all participate on an equal footing, disappears. The game in
                                                                                                                                     
14 R. BARTLETT, Economics and Power, Cambridge University Press,1989, p.157.
16
question is indeed similar to a chess game in which the "value" (the possibility of
movement) of each piece is continuously changing.
In the second alternative (distributive interventions) the attraction of a system
tending to be self-sufficient, able to eliminate the external interventions or to limit
them to a few exceptional cases, simply disappears. In fact, the event hypothesized in
the lake example (the invention, which creates the conditions for a possible lawmaker’s
intervention) exhibits no particular element of exceptionalness, but is rather
representative of a type of events occurring continuously.
We may yet again resort to the lake example and analyze it from another point
of view.   Imagine two universes: one, in which the right   to discharge is assigned to the
factory owner, and another, identical to the first, except for the fact that the right is
assigned to the bathers.
Suppose that the bathers have resources to invest in building recreation facilities.
In the first universe, reasonably concerned of having no right to clean water, they
decide to use the resources to have fun in other ways. In the second universe, aware of
the strength of their right, they decide   instead to invest in the lakeshore.
Imagine that in both universes the same technique is invented, that  allows t o
save production costs, but entails a greater pollution. It is obvious that for equal
magnitude of production costs savings and entailed levels of pollution, the new
technique has in universe 1 very different   chances of being put to use than the ones
the same technique has to be employed in universe 2. A very likely outcome is that the
technique will be adopted in the universe 1, where bathers do not assess the purity of
the lake waters  as much as to offer  the factory owner an amount greater  than the
value of production costs saved, but it will not be adopted  in  universe 2, where the
savings in production costs - however identical to what occurred  in  universe 1 - are
not such that the owner of the factory can offer bathers a certain amount able  t o
convince them to renounce  the use of  the lake .
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This example suggests certain reflections too. A first consideration is that the
outcomes in the two universes are  both efficient, each in the context of its universe,
but they certainly do not characterize  two fungible worlds. By generalizing the events
described in the example, we can imagine two worlds, one characterized by the adoption
of inexpensive techniques and polluted lakes, the other characterized by the use of
more expensive techniques and clean waters. Even putting   aside the distributional
effects (the greater or lesser welfare of the factory owner or of the buyers of the
factory’s products in comparison to greater or lesser welfare of the bathers), no reason
seems to exist that demonstrates that one of the two universes is more efficient or
more legitimate than the other.  
A second point which deserves to be noted, is that the difference between the two
results depends on the resources held, and the choices made, by the holders of the right.
As we saw, the simple fact of the   assignment of a right can influence the decisions of
the subjects concerned. In our example, bathers’  decision to build or not to build re-
creation facilities on the lake shore. Moreover, and more important, the decisions of
the right holders taken at t-1 influence in turn the decisions that all the interested
subjects will take at   t-2. In our example, the decisions taken by the bathers, before the
invention of the new technique, affect   each  party’s convenience in the use of the
invented technique, the results of the related deals, and eventually  effect the adoption
or the rejection of the new technology.
What happens here is particularly significant from the point of view of a legal
review of the two  situations. The point is that the market is not a locus in which
simple negative freedoms (the possibility of use of one's resources without interference
of the State or of other private individuals) coexist, but is a locus in which active
powers conflict with each other. Therefore, when the law assigns   property rights,
coupled with freedom of contract, it does not only assign the possibility (negative
freedom) of enjoying the things   every individual owns, it also assigns a power, the
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power of changing the legal and the effective    reality.  The power to continually
create    new rules and thereby new limits to the freedoms of others15.
In our example, the legal power granted to bathers to build infrastructure on the
lake that others must respect, and to recruit lifeguards, attendants, waiters, and so on,
gives them the opportunity of modifying, in a legally protected way, not only the legal,
but also    the factual reality. This is with the consequence that the undertaking of a
given activity (in our example, the spreading of a new technology) may be made more
expensive for third parties ( the factory owner) and for the whole  society. In other
words, the fact that we all will eventually live in a polluted world where goods cost
little, and not in a  clean world where goods cost more, comes to depend on the initial
assignments of power and  the use that the holders decide to make of their  powers.
From this point of view the indifference predicated in the Coasian narrative between
the assignment of the right to one or another of the two parties of a possible
transaction, does not stand.16
6. “Human” and “divine” Coasian worlds distinguished.
                                                
15 The point has been elaborated especially by E. DICIOTTI, Il mercato delle libertà, Il Mulino,
2006, p.52. See  also L.FERRAJOLI, Principia iuris, II,  Laterza, 2007, p.253.
16 The incidence - illustrated in the example of the lake - that different legal rules can have on the
use of future and  unforeseen inventions, is one of the many possible illustrations of the possible
existence of different competitive equilibria corresponding to different distributions of wealth.
D.H.REGAN, The problem of social cost revisited, in 15 The Journal of Law and Economics,
433 (1972) underlines that “Even granting then that the allocation before the change of legal rule
was efficient, and that the allocation after the change must also be efficient, there is no reason to
assume they must be the same, if the change of legal rule effected a redistribution of wealth, as
there is every reason to suppose it did”
We can add that  rules affect not only the distribution of wealth, but the distribution of the  legal
powers whose exploitation can  determine what   outcomes of  future deals will be efficient and
what will be inefficient.
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Of course, we can easily   imagine    worlds “more Coasian” than the world we
referred to in the previous paragraph. We can imagine a world in which the lawmaker is
able to foresee all the possible inventions and, more   generally, all the possible changes
to each and every individual and social conditions, as well as dictate rules applicable t o
every future situation, not only real, but also hypothetical ( so to inform the
contracting parties of what could be the law in every possible circumstance).
We can also imagine a world with markets for all possible future goods
“distinguished by their physical characteristics, by their place and date of delivery, and
also by the state of the world” or with insurance market for each date-event pair17. We
can obviously imagine a world in which the  factory owner may bribe the riparian
owners in order to convince them not to invest on the lake shores, the riparian owners
may bribe the inventor in order to  convince her not to invent a more polluting
technique,  the inventor may bribe the factory owner in order to gain a commitment t o
adopt her future invention, and so forth.
Putting aside the question whether it is worth living in a world in which we all
must be continuously careful of bribing the right person at the right moment, the
problem is that in both solutions (foreseeing lawmaker and   complete  markets for
careful contracting parties) we have to imagine a world populated by divine creatures
capable of foreseeing exactly each and every possible state of the future world and the
probabilities of each one of them taking place. Otherwise, every, even the smallest,
error of prediction can in fact prevent the attainment of the best results.
A world in which everything can be foreseen is a world without innovation in the
sense we are accustomed to. It is in fact a world without time. It seems to me a world of
eternity that only Souls and God-like creatures are able to inhabit.
                                                
17 D.M. NEWBERY, Missing Markets: Consequences and Remedies, in The Economics of
Missing Markets Information and Games, edited by F. Hahn, Clarendon Press, 1989, at 211, ff.
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In any case, a world where certain phenomena, whose elimination is physically
impossible in any imaginable universe, are deleted, cannot sustain a narrative capable of
providing rational arguments. At most it can provide a sort of “traditional” legitimacy
that is unacceptable in our post-metaphysical world.
So, going back to the notion of transaction costs, we can distinguish between
what we can call “social” transaction costs and what we can call “natural” transaction
costs. In the former category we can put the transaction costs whose elimination is
conceivable (though   not completely  attainable) even in a world governed by the same
physical and   psychological laws that govern the universe  which we actually live in. In
the latter, we can put the transaction costs that could disappear only in a world
governed by different laws, whose content every one can establish according t o
preference.
The possibility that unforeseen events occur, the consequences of which agents
are unable to assess, and sometimes even to imagine in advance,18 must therefore be
accepted as one of the characteristics of any imaginable universe, including a “human
Coasian” world.
A “divine Coasian ” world is also more or less vaguely imaginable. I do not think
however that those efforts of imagination are useful in the present context. It may be
that imagining a divine Coasian world results in utility elsewhere, but surely not in
legitimating the institutions of our secularized world .    
7. Failures of the “human-Coasian” world.
Having distinguished two kinds of Coasians worlds, my thesis, in the light of the
arguments discussed in the preceding paragraphs, is that a human Coasian world is a
world in which the coherent  fulfillment  of the   system of values  which has been
                                                
18 On the relationships between fundamental uncertainty and transaction costs, examined in the
perspective of the theories on the emergence of firms,  S.P.DUNN, Fundamental Uncertainty and
the Firm in the Long Run, 12 Review of Political Economy, 419 (2000).
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indicated as the basis of its potential legitimating function, is not obtained. I maintain
therefore that the possible legitimating strength of the Coasian narrative   is very low.
Many of the arguments that motivate this judgment have already been illustrated
in the previous paragraphs. A few points deserve to be underlined here, especially with
reference to the values that were indicated as possibly able to make the Coasian world a
world worth living in.
As we have already seen, the main values whose achievement should positively
qualify a Coasian world, are efficiency, liberty and a peculiar compromise between these
values and the value of equality or fairness.
As to the question of efficiency, a fundamental difficulty impairs the same
possibility of considering it as a value. The fact is that efficiency, interpreted as the
maximal feasible satisfaction of the preferences of all relevant individuals, is a “local”
concept, which has a (more or less precise) content only in a context in which the
relevant individuals and their preferences are precisely defined. On a more general level,
the concept loses its content, especially as the preferences become indeterminate and
the same identification of the relevant individuals may become uncertain. The
preferences become indeterminate not for empirical difficulties in the ascertainment
what the preferences of the concerned people actually are, but because beyond a given
level of complexity the preferences become difficult to define even for the   single
individual. Let us pose for instance the question whether the Roman Empire was more
efficient than the Mongol Empire or if the opposite is true. The question immediately
appears to be a   ridiculous one, even after   we have successfully established that the
relevant viewpoint is that of the Romans, the Mongols or ours.
The point necessitates closer examination, though for the sake of the present
argument this generic reference to the problem of defining “efficiency” may be
sufficient.
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With this general remark in mind, we can go back to the problem of the two
universes, respectively with clean or polluted waters, and with the usage of more or less
expensive techniques. The fact that a human Coasian  world can  indifferently develop
in either direction  without any reason provided for preferring either one, is in my
opinion sufficient enough  to exclude that the Coasian  narrative  may perform a
serious legitimating function. It is not capable of keeping the promise of a better
tomorrow, for the simple reason that it cannot determine what our tomorrow will be
and has no criteria for establishing    which  tomorrow should be appreciated as the best.
As to the hierarchy of the values, and the compromise between efficiency and
fairness, we have seen that in a human Coasian world various events may determine
distributions wholly independent on improvements of the overall efficiency of the
system.
Coming to the question of freedom and liberty, interpreted as the possibility  of a
collective self-government via voluntary exchanges with the intervention  of the
lawmaker  confined, in essence, to the initial assignment of rights, I have already
underlined that the promise cannot be kept. An acceptable human Coasian world
requires a constant legislative intervention, to correct distributions devoid of any
meaning, and / or to update the original allocation of rights to resources. It follows that
the relations between  the parties are continuously modified by the law. The results of  
free bargaining are therefore deprived of a possible procedural legitimacy provided by
their being the result of a process of free bargaining taking place within  rules of the
game established once and for all in advance19.
The last, and probably the most important, point is that liberty cannot be
considered only from the viewpoint of the possible intrusions of the lawmaker in the
private spheres of the individuals. We know that another, even more odious, limit t o
individual liberty exists: the power a private individual can exert over  other private
                                                
19 On this point see F. PARISI,  Private Property and Social Costs, 2 European Journal of Law
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individuals. This is an incumbent problem even in a human Coasian world, as we have
already seen when we  underlined  that the evolution towards a universe of type 1 or of
type 2 depends on the exercise of the power assigned to some individuals rather than t o
others. This is a main theme, and we shall explore it more closely in the last part of the
paper.  
8. Private power and the role of the transaction costs.
Through previous arguments the conclusion follows that the Coasian narrative is
unable to perform the function of providing rational arguments in favor of  the way the
problems of the assignment of rights are framed by the economic analysis of law
movement. It cannot perform this function on a global level, as it is not able to keep
its promises pertaining to the system of values that could be  fulfilled by moving
towards, or by mimicking the main features of, a human Coasian world.
I would  pose  now a residual question  and explore the problem as to whether  the
Coasian narrative can perform the more limited function of identifying a variable, the
social  transaction costs, as  the most important amongst the obstacles which,  in the
majority of  situations we face  in the real world, are able to prevent the attainment
of the best  possible results. Having established that  the elimination of all social
transaction costs is not the path towards  the promised Eden, we can ask ourselves
whether it is at least the best way to improve our life in this “valley of tears”.    
In less mystical words, we can now pose the question whether social  transaction
costs (the only costs that can be eliminated by human actions) deserve the prominent
position they enjoy in the Coasian tradition of the economic analysis of law
movement.
As  is well known, and as we have already underlined, in the Coasian tradition,
transaction costs are considered paramount because they may prevent the interested        
parties from  bargaining to the efficient solution. Absent transaction costs, it is
                                                                                                                                     
and Economics,149 (1995) at 157.
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assumed,  the parties will always negotiate an agreement that maximizes the social
product. Thus, the indications suggested by the legal interpreters of the Coase’s
thought: legal rules should be designed to assign legal entitlements so that transaction
costs are minimized and   where they cannot be reduced,  legal rules should dictate a
solution that achieves the result that the parties would have reached through bargaining.
In the previous paragraphs we examined the normative profile of that
prescription and endeavored to demonstrate that there is a  lack of a solid foundation.
A human Coasian world is not a place worth  living in. Therefore, there is no rational
argument in favor of trying to approximate the real world to the Coasian world (even if
it were possible).
Now   I  shall examine another, more limited (though practically more relevant)
question, in which normative  problems are intertwined with empirical and pragmatic
aspects. The question is whether it   is     correct    and appropriate to start our framing
of the legal problems posed by   human (or at least human-economic) relationships with
an analysis of the phenomena transaction costs refer to. It is no longer a matter of
great narratives. It is rather a local problem, a simple problem of how to build a
research project and of identifying the main factors that affect the solution of the
problems we face. Correctness and appropriateness remain debatable judgments (we are
still treating a problem of legitimacy, not a problem of absolute truths). The difference
is that here they depend   not  on comprehensive narratives, but  on empirical evidence
and practical judgments of  convenience.
In our case, the problem is whether transaction costs are the only or   main (both
in terms of empirical assessments and of judgments of value) impediments to efficient
solutions and therefore the variable on which we have to concentrate our attention.
My thesis is that the most important factor we have to consider in solving the
problems of human cooperation are not the phenomena connected to the notion of
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transaction costs, but the phenomena connected to the notion of power and to the
problems of its distribution.
9. Power asymmetries in the bargaining thesis and in the
Coasian narrative.
The attitude of power relationships to affect the bargaining process, and its
results, has been extensively examined as a possible factor which could prevent rational
actors from reaching in every transaction the most efficient result 20 Leaving aside
other important doctrines (asymmetries of resources ownership are deemed a very
relevant variable in the literature on economic development21 and on strategic
bargaining between parties unequally endowed22) the asymmetries in resource ownership
(and the consequent asymmetries of power) are especially considered in the so-called
“bargaining thesis” which  regards them as  the main factor affecting the process of
genesis of social institutions.23  
                                                
20 See e.g. R.COOTER, The Cost of Coase,  XI  Journal of Legal Studies,19 (1982),at 15. .
D.H.REGAN, The problem of social cost revisited,  15 The Journal of Law and Economics, 433
(1972)
21 D.  ACEMOGLU, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and
Politics, in Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2003,Available at :
SSRN http://.com/abstract=545463
22 R.G.RAJAN-L.ZINGALES, The Tyranny of Inequality., (May 1999). CRSP Working Paper
No. 423 available at SSRN:    http://ssrn.com/abstract=206508   .
 
23 Developed especially by J. KNIGHT, Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge University
Press, 1992; J.KNIGHT- J.JOHNSON, On the Priority of Democracy: A Pragmatist Approach to
Political-Economic Institutions and the Burden of Justification, in 101 American Political
Science Review, 53 (2007): “On this account, social institutions are a by-product of strategic
conflict over substantive social outcomes. The mechanism of selection among the possible
institutional alternatives is bargaining among the actors over the various alternatives. Institutional
development is a contest among actors to establish rules that   structure outcomes to those
equilibria most favorable for them.”
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Obviously the existence of power asymmetries cannot be contested. In fact the
dissent of the proponents of the bargaining thesis with the followers of the Coasian
tradition is not on this point (existence of power asymmetries) but on the effects that
power relationships can have on the allocation of the resources. In particular, the
central question is whether power distribution can affect the allocation of the resources
and whether power asymmetries may prevent the parties from reaching the agreements
that could  maximize  the aggregate benefit of their joint activity.
The argument that power asymmetries could prevent the reaching of efficient
agreements is based on the idea that rational self-interested individuals “will prefer a
contract   that maximizes  their individual benefits over a contract that maximizes
aggregate benefits”24. They   will prefer a bigger slice of a smaller pie to a smaller slice
of a bigger pie.
In the Coasian tradition the reply to this argument   is as usual based on the
assumption of zero transaction costs. Absent transaction costs, the distributive
consequences of every deal can be established by the parties and, therefore, nothing
prevents the weaker   party   from   offering   to the stronger one any   distribution of
the benefits of the deal that can satisfy the stronger party’s desires. In this context, a
greater aggregate benefit that can be divided according any criteria whatsoever the
parties agree upon, will produce, by definition,   at least one share  greater than the
largest of the shares in which a smaller aggregate benefit can be divided.
The problem seems to concern  (as always)   the presence of  transaction costs
that could prevent side payments to the more powerful party or may   generally  reduce
the range of the alternatives “such that there is no sufficient correspondence between
                                                                                                                                     
24 J.KNIGHT, Models ,Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional
Emergence and Change, in Explaining Social Institutions, edited by J. Knight and I. Sened,   The
University of Michigan Press,1998, at 113.
27
efficiency and distributional advantage to offset the effects of individual self-interest on
the selection of a particular rule”25.
If this were the case, if in fact the elimination of transaction  costs  impeding side
payments is in some contexts ( international State relationships, certain  kinds of
political bargaining, etc.) impossible, then the validity of the Coase theorem, and of the
whole conception of the process of institutional development which is connected with
the Coase's lesson 26 should be limited to the social contexts in which contracts occur
between actors of equal power or in which arbitrary asymmetries of power amongst the
actors are neutralized.27 This is in fact the thesis proposed by the adherents to the
bargaining theory.
It is worth noting that in the literature briefly examined just a moment ago, the
possible relevance of power relationships is still dependent on the existence of
transaction costs, notably the transaction costs able to prevent the securing of side
payments in  favor  of the more powerful parties (and on the following difficulty of
convincing them to accept agreements which, as such considered -lacking side
payments- may entail results that  they consider unsatisfactory).  
In this vein, we are still concerned with a problem of possible elimination of
transaction costs (at least if we decide to call transaction costs the difficulties of
establishing credible commitments in favor of the most powerful parties of the
bargain). Given that these costs are theoretically eliminable (in our terminology they
are “social”, not “natural” transaction costs) the controversy ends up in the empirical
                                                
25 Id., at 117.
26 The so called contract theory,  developed especially by D.C.NORTH, Institutions, Institutional
Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press,1990. Id. A Transaction Cost
Theory of Politics, in 3 The Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1991,355.
27 J.KNIGHT, Models, note16, at 95. In a different perspective the  priority of creating fair
contexts in which rules and contracts can work efficiently is argued in F.DENOZZA, supra note 8.
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dispute about whether transaction costs of this kind (capable of preventing side
payments) are more or less widespread and more or less easily removable.
To sum up, both (the followers of the contract theory and its critics), share the
conviction  that power positions can be transferred like any other good. They dissent
only on the practical recurrence of the conditions that can prevent the powerful from
accepting a social arrangement that, however efficient, may entail a decrease in her
power. In this perspective, transaction costs are the governing variable even in the
presence of power asymmetries. Absent transaction costs, power relationships could be
neutralized in every situation, and they would cease to perform a relevant role.
Instead, I would like to explore a different perspective in which power
relationships may affect the results of a bargaining process in a way which is fully
independent on the existence of transaction costs that make side payments unfeasible,
and is instead strictly connected to the essential features of the notion of power, and t o
the empirical attributes of its forms of concretization.   
At the empirical level, I maintain that power relationships are able to hinder
(“fetter”, in the Marxian language) the development of the system even where
transaction  costs ( of course, we speak of social  transactions costs, that are the only
that can be eliminated in the real world) are absent.
At the level of value judgments, I   maintain  that problems concerning  power
distribution deserve  much more consideration than the phenomena connected to the
transaction costs do.
10- Power  and   its   theoretical   and practical properties.   Power   
v.   Influence.
As we have seen, the main idea shared by the different theories previously
examined, is that power does not matter, because it may be sold and bought like
everything else.28  If individual A by exploiting her power in a given way can cause
                                                
28 The difficulties in the conceiving of power as a commodity is explored, from a different
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individual  B a harm bigger than the benefit for herself, B can simply pay A a sum of
money to induce her to use her power in a different way. This is a classical Coasian
bargain, and the reference to anything we have called “power” (  instead  of  resorting
to the more usual language in which what is exchanged is called  resource, property,
right or in any akin way)  seems unable to change the frame and the results of the
reasoning.
The  point  deserves  a closer examination. I will argue that in the Coasian
narrative problems  of power distribution are concealed   by   some   conceptual
vagueness    which confuses power with influence, and ignores the distinction   between
the power interpreted as a dispositional concept and the power interpreted as the
episodic exercise of this dispositional attitude.
The indifference predicated in the Coasian narrative between the assignment of
the right to one or another of the two parties of a possible transaction, and the
consequent faith in the centrality of   transaction costs ( up  to the point that the same
choice of the assignee of the right is conceived as a function  of the constellation of
transaction costs existing in any given situation), follows just from the confusion
between power and influence.
Going back to the example of the lake, let us imagine that the lake is used by a
factory and by a fishery and that the latter has to decide whether to invest in
improving its activity in front of the possibility that in the future a new technique
creates an opportunity for the factory to exploit   the lake in a way that is not
compatible with fishing. In the classical Coasian version of the evolution of this
situation, the other interested    party offers the right   holder  a sum of money    in
order to prevent her be  from taking the course of action that may interfere with the
other party's projects. Thus, either the fishermen offer the factory owner a
                                                                                                                                     
viewpoint by, U.  Pagano Is power an economic good ? Notes on Social Scarcity and the
Economics of Positional Goods. in S. Bowles, N. Franzini  and U. Pagano (eds) The politics and
Economics of Power, Routledge, London ,1999, p.53.
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compensation for the commitment to not modify the technique she is using in her
factory, or the factory owner offers the fishermen a compensation for waiving t o
invest. In both cases the fate of the  lake depends on the comparison between the
amount of the compensation offered and on  the profits the right holder expects from
the future activity she is asked to surrender.
In a divine Coasian world, the  reservation price of the  right holder and the
compensation offered by the other party reflect exactly the reciprocal expected
profits. The destiny of the lake is therefore decided by the relationship between the
magnitudes of these two variables. The party with higher expected profits will
invariably conquer the right of using the lake, and the system will invariably produce
the maximal feasible amount of gains. Power does not matter.
If we consider a  human  Coasian world  in which the parties are absolutely free t o
contract with no cost, but are not able to exactly foresee the future, the terms of the
problem change. In fact, between the two parties a difference exists, that is neglected in
the Coasian narrative and   deserves   instead consideration.  One of the two parties, the
right holder, can  effect  the result , in the sense that she can determine the result by
simply deciding not to assume any commitment. The other party can only  affect  the
result, via  the incidence her offerings ( of rewarding in different measure the different
conducts of the right holder )  may have on the decision taken by the latter.29  If the
reward offered for the  “correct” conduct ( the conduct of the right holder that
maximizes the joint  gain of the two parties and of the whole society)  is considered by
the right holder insufficient for whatever reason, there is no way whatsoever  t o
compel her to make the “correct” decision.
This difference is concealed in the Cosean narrative by one simple move, that of
considering only two ( totally  de-socialized) parties in a context in which both are
constrained to act according to a given rule (that of maximizing one's immediate gain).  
                                                
29 The difference is especially stressed by P. MORRISS, Power, A philosophical analysis, second
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In this situation power, that is the ability to act according to one's will and not
according to a given rule, simply disappears.
We can however easily imagine a different situation in which the right holder
faces different counterparts each making  an  offer of a magnitude  determined in
accordance with  her forecast for the level of her future profits. If one, or some, of the
offering parties make a mistake in deciding the “right” amount of the offer, this does
not matter if at least one makes the right offer. But if  the right holder is mistaken  ( if
she is expecting a totally “wrong” offer) there is no way of reaching the “right” result.
This makes a big difference between individuals who have power and individuals who
can only try to influence the decisions of the powerful.
The difference becomes especially relevant if we consider a factor as important
as uncertainty, a factor which is absent  in the divine  Coasian world, but is inevitably
present in the real world and in any conceivable  human Coasian world30.
In presence of absolute uncertainty, and lacking markets able to give a price t o
any future event, “individuals must make guesses about opportunity costs”31 The point
is that the “guess” of the powerful counts much more than the guess of the powerless.
The efficiency of the results of the dealings depends much more on the prevision
capacities of the former than on that of the latter.
In a perspective   concerned with problems of legitimacy this point cannot be
considered as irrelevant. We may  even accept of  entrusting our destiny  (the
attainment of the most efficient results ) to the random ability, of the  concerned
                                                                                                                                     
edition, Manchester University Press, 2002,p.29.
30 “In a world without uncertainty, the notion of power dissolves and loses much of its
importance” M. LAVOIE, Foundations  of Post Keynesian Economic Analysis, Aldershot,
Edward Elgar, 1992, at 100. V.MONVOISIN -  L.-P. ROCHON, Economic Power and the Real
World, A Post-Keynesian Analysis of Power, 35 Int. Journal of Political Economy, 5 (2006-7)
at12  “Hence the absence of power in neoclassical theory is reached by eliminating two important
concepts: social conflict and uncertainty.”
31 A. PRZEWORSKI, States and Markets, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 49.
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individuals, to foresee the “right” developments of the given situation ( and therefore
to establish an “efficient” price for every possible transaction). There is, instead, no
rational reason for entrusting our future to the interested predictions of the powerful.
11. Power as a dispositional attitude.
Other problems in the Coasian narrative arise from failing to distinguish between
the sale of  a  single, concrete, exercise  of a given power, and the sale of the power
position as such. I contend that whilst the former (the single concrete exercise of a
given power) may be treated  as a something that can be more or less easily evaluated
and transferred, the latter exhibits some peculiarities that are  in my opinion able t o
prevent efficient agreements, in a way that is much more disturbing than the way
transaction costs do.
The Coasian narrative fails to appreciate the  distinction  between  power
positions, with their dispositional attitude32, and  episodic  acts of exercise of power.
The cause of this confusion resides again in the usual move of presenting two parties,
detached from the rest of the society in which they live, and engaged in a single deal,
with   payouts,  and  rules of the game,  fully specified in advance, once and for all. In
this context there is no difference between power as such considered and a single
exercise of power.
The Coasian is in fact a fully static world with a pie whose size is given, and in
which   everyone knows what  the maximum size that can be obtained is, and the recipe
that allows the achievement of this result. In such a static world, power relationships
can be easily neutralized   simply because they, in a sense,  do not exist at all.
                                                                                                                                     
32 P. MORRISS, Power, A philosophical analysis, second edition, Manchester University Press,
2002,p.14. S LUKES, Power: A Radical View, second edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
p. 109. D.H.WRONG, Power..Its Forms,Bases,and Uses,  Transaction Publishers, New
Brunwick-London,second printing,1997,p.6. S.R. CLEGG, Frameworks of Power , SAGE
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Power as a dispositional attitude is distinguishable from the single acts of its
exercise only when we consider an indeterminate future which the powerful has the
opportunity to influence, if not to model, in her own interest33. Power becomes a
relevant variable when we are confronted with a world, as is the world we live in, in
which the   problem is not only, and may be neither mainly, that of  producing  goods
with the  resources available in any given instant,  but that of reproducing the society as
a  whole.  That of reproducing not only the  main aspects of society’s economic life,
but also its particular form of social organization (in Marxian terminology, its
“production-relations”). A form which must adapt itself to the changing conditions  of
the capitalist development and continuously invent new practices,  institutions and
rules compatible both with the preservation of  its basic structure  and with the further
development of the productive forces.
The dispositional attitude of the power  can be fully appreciated only in the
perspective of a dynamic world facing an uncertain future and struggling with the
imperative of  both maintaining and transforming  its particular form of social
organization in front of continuously changing  conditions.  
The fact that we are considering economic power, thus a power which arises from
the control over things mediated by property rights, should not hide the difference
between the value of things as such considered, and the value of the power conferred by
the ability of controlling them.  The   evaluation of a power position depends in fact
on   the   exact forecast of the complete set of the opportunities of  its exploitation.
In a narrative in which attention is paid only to the  property rights of the
parties, something important is missing. In fact, property rights  can be imagined in a
way almost completely independent from the  historical  characteristics of the society
in which they exist. Many attributes of the property rights have remained unchanged
                                                
33 “Power should be understood as the capacity of one or several classes to realize their specific
interests” N. POULANTZAS, State, Power, Socialism, English translation, Verso, 2000, p.147.
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since the Roman law up to the present day. This does not imply that we can consider
the actual position of all property holders as  immutable and always equal to itself  in
the endless  course of the centuries.
The point is that even where the structure of the property rights does not
change, what may change  is the level of  social  power enjoyed by the right holder. The
level of social power conferred by the property right  depends  much less on the  legal
structure of the right, than on the social and practical conditions of the context in
which the right can be exercised.  An  apple  harvest may confer to its owner very
different levels of power.  It  depends  on the social and economic situation of the
property holder : whether she is a  member of a capitalist society or of a feudal society,
whether a  competitive market for apples exists, or she is the only owner of apples in
the world, etc.
Let us consider for example a power position like that enjoyed by a monopolist.
Monopolist's customers may in hypothesis bribe the monopolist in order to induce him
to practice competitive prices34. As is well known, the amount of  harm suffered by the
costumers who decide to buy at the monopolistic price plus the harm suffered by
customers who decide to resort to the second best alternative, is bigger than the profit
earned by the monopolist. Therefore the  customers, assuming zero transaction costs,
can bribe the monopolist in order to induce her to practice competitive prices.
                                                
34 On this subject (monopolies in a world with no transaction costs) se G. STIGLER,  The Law
and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 Journal of Legal  Studies, 12 (1972):
in a world with no transaction costs “Monopolies would be compensated to act like competitors..”
(this statement is approved  by R.H.COASE, The Firm, at 158) .  G. CALABRESI, Transaction
Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules: A Comment, 11 J. Law and Econ.,67, at 70
(1968) “Assuming no transaction costs, those who lose  from the relative underproduction of
monopolies could bribe the monopolists to produce more”. C. J. DAHLAN, The Problem  of
Externalities, 22 J.Law and Econ.,141 (1979), at 142, underlines that  monopoly and public
goods can be treated as  subcategories of externalities. F. PARISI,  Private Property and Social
Costs, 2 European Journal of Law and Economics,149 (1995) at 156.
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But what about the sale of the monopolistic position as such? Is it possible t o
conceive of a situation in which customers are able to institute a system of free
competition by buying  the monopoly position as such ?
I argue that the possibility of the monopoly position as such being sold, is much
more difficult to imagine. In fact, the value of the monopoly position for the
monopolist is composed of at least two addenda: the profits that can be earned in any
single episodic exploitation of monopolistic  power, plus the value of the possibility of
increasing these profits by, for example, reducing the production costs. The first
addendum corresponds to the difference between monopolistic and competitive prices
and, as we have just noted, the existing ( in the given moment considered) customers
are interested in  bribing the monopolist in order to convince her to practice
competitive prices. As to the second addendum, the problem is: what is the price of the
possibility of increasing profits in ways that are barred to firms acting on competitive
markets  and who are the individuals willing to pay for it? I think that the great
difficulties in answering   to this question are rather evident.     
It is already   difficult to measure the part of the value of a monopoly
consisting of the (discounted) profits that the monopolist will be able to earn in a
definite time (the time the monopoly will presumably last) rebus sic stantibus, that is, in
a future imagined as a projection of the given situation. Much more difficult is the
estimation of the value of  the chance the monopolist has (and the firm in a
competitive market does not) of converting into profit any gain  in productivity and of
modeling some of the future characteristics of the market, for example by choosing t o
develop one instead of another technology, one or another level of compatibility of
the product in question with other products, and so forth35.
                                                
35 This point is usually neglected by ultra-liberal or libertarian thinkers. For them economic power
“is simply the right under freedom to refuse to make an exchange. Every man has this power.
Every man has the same right to refuse to make a proffered exchange” M. N. ROTHBARD, Man,
Economy , State (the scholar’s Edition with Power and Market). Ludwig von Mises Institute,
36
The first  difficulty in imagining  this chance bought and sold like any ordinary
commodity stems from the fact that its value depends on the gains that the holder of
the power will be able to collect from   a series of acts of exercise of her power that
cannot be defined in advance and that will vary according to future concrete
unforeseeable circumstances.
Another difficulty concerning the creation of a market for power arises from the
fact that its future   exercise may affect different people in different ways according t o
the unforeseeable circumstances and the contingent decisions of the power holder. In
the case, for instance, of the monopoly power, the way in which the exercise of the
power will affect different categories of consumers and of competitors, depends on the
evaluations  the monopolist will make of  what is more in her interest in each set of
the different  circumstances she will face in the future. Therefore, determining in
advance how much the future exercise of a given power will affect each potentially
interested   individual  is  almost impossible, making thereby impossible the calculus of
the price each individual might be willing to offer for inducing the powerful t o
relinquish whole or part of her power.  
In summary, my thesis is that power, interpreted as a disposition distinct from
the single acts in which it is exercised, cannot be treated as a commodity which can be
bought and sold in an appropriate market, due to the practical and theoretical
difficulties of establishing its value. These difficulties may be relevant when the goal is
                                                                                                                                     
2004, p.1327. On the contrary, the essence of economic power  is the ability to define the status
of futures worlds and the conditions in which future exchanges shall occur. “Contracts by their
nature are no longer simply private relationships that leave others’ rights and duties unaffected;
they become publicly enforceable agreements altering others’ rights and obligations. Contracts
impose upon others duties to recognize and respect contractual terms, and upon governments
duties of  coercive enforceability.” S. FREEMAN, Illiberal Libertarian : Why Libertarianism Is
Not a Liberal View, 30 Philosophy and Public Affairs, 105 (2001) at132.
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the transfer of a power position from one to another individual. They become almost
insurmountable when the goal is the sale of a power position in view of its dissolution.       
Obviously, almost everything can be the object of a sale or of a  barter. 36 In fact,
power positions are usually transferred often together with the material or immaterial
resources whose possession the power position stems from, as in the case of the sale of
firms with monopoly power. The point, however, is that when what is at stake is not
the transfer of a position of power from an individual to another , but the  sale of  the
power position as such (in the sense that the power is not transferred but eliminated )
the probability of dealings reaching efficient results is, in a human Coasian world, very
low. It is difficult to identify the parties  interested to  the deal and it is even more
difficult for each party to establish the price. This is the reason why power position are
often transferred but seldom eliminated by free and consensual bargaining37.
Power, interpreted as a dispositional attitude, is a “thing” that is in fact
composed by an almost innumerable set of  different elements, as we saw in the case of
the monopoly power, whose value depends on a large amount of  different future
events, markets for which do not  exist  in the real world and are difficult to conceive
even in a human Coasian world. 38 If the value of a simple thing as a booked taxi
                                                
36 Even if  “Nothing like  a  free market of power has ever existed or will exist” B.BARNES, The
Nature of Power, Polity press,  1988, p.87.
37 As noted by K.MARX, Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Vintage,1973) p.303,
“…I may well separate capital from a given individual capitalist , and it can be transferred to
another. But in losing capital, he loses the quality of being capitalist. The capital is indeed
separable from the individual capitalist, but not from the capitalist, who as such confront the
worker”.
38In order to have complete markets and “for the first theorem to apply, goods must be
distinguished by their physical characteristics, by their place and date of delivery, as well as by the
state of the world” A. PRZEWORSKI, States and Markets, Cambridge University Press, 2003,
43. A ting which is unattainable in a human  Coasian world.
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changes according to the status of the weather at the moment expected for its use  ( the
same taxi being presumably more valuable if raining than if sunny39), it is not so easy
to imagine markets able to give the “correct” price  to a complex “thing” like a power
position.      
12- Conclusions.
Finally, let us come to the question whether transaction costs are a correct and
appropriate starting point from which to examine the problems of human
relationships.
Transaction costs may obviously impair the possibility for a party to affect the
decisions of another party. They can prevent the party without power from making an
offer (contract) or from making a threat (lawsuit) in order to convince the powerful
party to act in a “rational” way. I contend, however, that the social context
determining who is the powerless and who is the powerful, is much more important
than the transaction costs, that disturb the relationships between powerless and
powerful individuals. This does not mean that transaction costs are irrelevant. They
may prevent workers from creating a valid countervailing power to the power of
employers; they may prevent consumers from coordinating their actions against
monopolistic firms, and  so forth.
Eventually, they might  prevent us from not only reaching a better result chosen
among given possible outcomes, but also from making feasible new possible outcomes
in which “some are helped and no one is harmed”40.
 What I contend, however, is that transaction costs (especially as are usually
conceived of) are not the most important factor in determining unacceptable results.
                                                
39 Ibidem.
40 G. CALABRESI, The Pointless of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 Yale L.J.,1211
(1991).
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   Coming a bit more closely to the real problems we face in the real world, take
for instance the case regarding the discipline of  financial markets, and especially the
part concerning the relationships between investors and financial intermediaries.
Transactions between investors and financial intermediaries are usually analyzed in
terms of information asymmetries, consequent market failure and need of a regulation
capable of restoring the functioning of the market. Instead, is rather evident that the
main factor which in fact affects these kinds of transactions, is not the information
asymmetry, but the production relations of the “financial industry”, characterized by
countless situations in which the intermediaries’ interests conflict with the interests of
their clients.  Lacking these conflicts of interest, one could  trust  the impartiality of
the advisor- intermediary and no complex (and often confused) special protection such
as that  established e.g. by the MIFID European directive   would be necessary.
In this vein I maintain that in this case, as in many important other cases, the “
legitimate” starting point for a correct analysis should be the power relationships that
define the context in which the transactions take place and not the single transaction.
More in general, the point is that we are often confronted with power positions
which  (for many reasons) we are not able to dismantle.  The organization of the
financial industry, together with all   its conflicts of interests we just recalled, is a
perfect example of  a set of  intertwined powers that are considered not  modifiable due
to their alleged ability to induce efficiency. But one can bring to mind the  monopolistic
power enjoyed by many firms, or likewise the power of  people managing  giant
corporations.
As to the latter,  one may  consider that in every theoretical construction ( from
Berle&Means to the agency problem narrative) and in every corporate governance
model (from the Angle-Saxon to the Rhenish to the Latin)  beyond all differences, an
element exists that does not vary. In all these real models, and in all these theoretical
constructions, despite their differences, we are confronted with the same problem: the
40
existence of a power position ( the discretionary power of the managers, be they
owners, partial owners, syndicated owners, professional managers and so forth) that we
cannot dismantle, and the necessity to balance this power with a countervailing power,
we search everywhere for 41, be it the banks, the minority shareholders, the financial
market and so on.
I contend that having established that in a divine  Coasian world a simple,
“complete”, contract could solve all  problems, is neither helpful, nor an appropriate
starting point. If the objective is that of  inventing an “organization that might make
us all better off” 42, then the main problem lies not in what can prevent contracts
between powerful and powerless people, but in  the way in which power is allocated.
The latter is in my opinion the legitimate starting point.
                                                
41  Not only   “macro” countervailing powers in the Galbraith's vein, (whose importance , far from
being undermined, has been on the contrary enhanced by the globalization of the market, see  G.
AMATO,  Antitrust and the Bounds of Power. The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the History
of the Market,  Hart Publishing,  1997, It.translation Il potere e l’antitrust, Il Mulino, 1998,
p.117) but also  “local” countervailing powers, able to  limit the discretion of the power holder.
42 G.CALABRESI, supra note 28.
